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Auditing playbook

A practical playbook for finding real vulnerabilities in MCP servers using mcpwn. Each recipe maps a threat class to a concrete, repeatable workflow.

For the full catalogue of MCP attack classes - each with its CWE, the mcpwn detector/template/dvmcp server that covers it, and remediation - see the MCP threat taxonomy (docs/THREATS.md). Turn any findings dir into CVSS v3.1 + CWE advisories with mcpwn advisory <findings-dir> -o <dir>.

Authorized testing only. Run servers you own or are explicitly allowed to assess. The cleanest legal footing is to npx/run the open-source server locally on your own machine - you own that execution - and disclose any findings responsibly (see ADVISORY_TEMPLATE.md).

Wrap the target server with mcpwn and drive it with any MCP client (or the demo agent). Start passive to learn the surface:

Terminal window
mcpwn -v -l session.jsonl -- npx -y <target-mcp-server> [args...]

Then enumerate: every tools/list, resources/list, and prompts/list response tells you the attack surface and the input schemas you can abuse.


1. Server-side input flaws (the highest-value bugs)

Section titled “1. Server-side input flaws (the highest-value bugs)”

These are real, exploitable CVEs - path traversal, SSRF, command injection, IDOR - reachable through tools/call arguments. mcpwn is the harness for crafting them; use -i to hold a tools/call and hand-edit arguments.

For any tool that takes a path/filename, hold the request and try:

../../../../etc/passwd
..\..\..\..\windows\win.ini
/etc/passwd
file:///etc/passwd
%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd # if the server URL-decodes
/proc/self/environ # secrets in env
a/../../../../etc/passwd # defeats naive prefix checks

What a hardened server does (verified against @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem): normalizes + resolves to absolute, checks resolved.startsWith(allowedDir + sep) (note the trailing separator - without it, /allowed-evil bypasses /allowed), rejects null bytes, and calls fs.realpath to resolve symlinks before access. If a server skips any of these - especially the trailing-separator check or the realpath/symlink step - it is likely vulnerable.

For any tool that fetches a URL (fetch, http_get, web tools), hold and try:

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ # cloud metadata
http://localhost:6379/ # internal services
http://[::1]:22/
file:///etc/passwd # scheme confusion
http://127.0.0.1:80@evil.test/ # parser confusion

A safe server blocks private/link-local ranges after DNS resolution and restricts schemes. Check for TOCTOU: does it resolve DNS once for the check and again for the fetch?

For tools that shell out (git, grep, build tools):

; id ;
$(id)
`id`
--output=/tmp/pwned
-- ; rm -rf (dry-run only on your own box)

2. Indirect prompt injection via tool results

Section titled “2. Indirect prompt injection via tool results”

The signature mcpwn workflow. Use a rule to inject attacker text into the result the agent ingests, then observe whether the agent acts on it.

Terminal window
mcpwn -r examples/attack-inject.json -- npx -y <target>

See payloads/prompt-injection.txt for a seed wordlist (or mcpwn payloads show prompt-injection). The finding is “the agent obeys instructions found in tool output” - demonstrate it by getting the agent to call a sensitive tool it shouldn’t.

Hold a tools/list response and inject instructions into a tool’s description (the poisonDescription action). Tests whether the host renders or the model obeys hidden directives in tool metadata.

Serve a benign tools/list during approval, then mutate it mid-session with a matchReplace rule so the live definition differs from what the user approved.

5. Sampling abuse (servers that use sampling/createMessage)

Section titled “5. Sampling abuse (servers that use sampling/createMessage)”

Watch for server→client sampling/createMessage requests. Hold and edit them to test whether the host blindly forwards server-authored prompts into the user’s LLM.


TargetVersionResult
@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem2026.1.14No traversal/symlink escape via the vectors above - validation uses trailing-separator prefix check + fs.realpath. Hardened.

Contributions of further audits (positive or negative) are welcome - negative results are valuable too: they document what’s already safe.